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SCIENCE EDUCATION AND MORAL EDUCATION 
by Holmes Rolston III 
Abstract. Both science and ethics are embedded in cultural tradi-
tions where truths are shared through education; both need com-
petent critics educated within such traditions. Education in both 
ought to be directed although moral education demands levels of 
responsible agency that science education does not. Evolutionary 
science often carries an implicit or explicit understanding of who 
and what humans are, one which may not be coherent with the 
implicit or explicit human self-understanding in moral education. 
The latter in turn may not be coherent with classical human 
self-understandings. Moral education may enlighten and elevate 
the human nature that has evolved biologically. 
Keywords: Darwinism; ethics; evolution; moral education; nature 
and culture; science education; values clarification. 
 
 
Sometimes seemingly separate story lines collide and surprise us with a 
deeper logic. While events are taking place, in their novelty, they are 
over the heads of the actors; what is really going on only becomes 
clearer later, after a creative advance in understanding. Martin Eger's 
story of two controversies—in science education and moral 
education—is seminal for the issues his dual tale invites us to clarify. 
Here is education at its best; we are told a story about the education of 
high school youth. When we who hear it sort through its penetrating 
irony, we find ourselves better educated. 
Nor is this drama over. We have only reached the point of seeing how 
the two stories in their clash and mutual transformation have now 
become one, whereupon we—as actors—must identify the leading 
questions we have to resolve. 
SCIENCE AND ETHICS AS EMBEDDED IN CULTURAL TRADITIONS 
In theory and in practice we now face troubling questions about the 
extent to which any convictions that persons hold are embedded in 
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their cultures. Both science and morals (as well as religion, politics, art, 
literature) are historical traditions, communal achievements, that 
shape their own criteria of rationality and intelligibility, their value 
judgments, their directions of development. Scientists quite as fully as 
moralists operate in mutually reinforcing networks of truths. 
Humans—whether modern, postmodern, liberal, conservative, or 
classical—live within more or less coherent, sometimes complementary 
and conflicting traditions. These are delivered to us in our schooling; 
they form us as they inform us. 
No one person's education verifies directly more than a fraction of 
these commonly accepted truths: that the Earth is round, that moss 
sporophytes are diploid, that DNA exists, that Jesus died on the cross, 
that slavery and murder are wrong.  We inherit these truths, spot- 
testing them in our own experience, plus thinking through their impli-
cations and some testing of the reliability of our sources. Except where 
we labor on the cutting edge of a discipline, decisions here are mostly 
about whom to trust. An education sometimes involves hands on ex-
perience; it is mostly handed on. 
One should think for one's self. Indeed! Yet no one thinks by one's 
self, any more than one talks by one's self; one thinks in community 
with the resources of one's tradition. One may hear the beat of a 
different drummer, but one cannot evaluate that beat until one has also 
experienced the classical rhythms. Those who create a moral system 
from scratch, just as those who do science alone, are likely to remain 
primitive. One should think for one's self, standing on the shoulders of 
those who have thought before—skeptical of lonesome beliefs, shared 
by no one else, favoring beliefs arising in conversation with many 
others who think in mutual support. A thousand heads are better than 
one—unless the head is that of Socrates, Jesus, or Albert Einstein. 
What Thomas Kuhn taught us a generation ago about science, Alas- 
dair MacIntyre taught us a decade ago about ethics, and George 
Lindbeck has more recently taught us about theology. Each is embed-
ded in a conceptual framework so comprehensive that it shapes its own 
criteria of adequacy. Pervasive and persuasive paradigms govern what 
communities of scientists look for and how they interpret what they 
find. The search for an autonomous, universal ethic, defended by a 
neutral rationality, has failed; ethics attaches to dynamic, historical 
world views.  The primary goal of a humanist is typically to be self- 
actualizing; but Christians, Buddhists, Muslims will demur—or concur 
by reunderstanding what self-actualizing means. Some kinds of ethics 
do not have to be derived from theology, but other kinds must or may 
be—and are for many Americans—and such ethics may bear an uncer-
tain relationship to an ethics grounded in Darwinism (as we see below). 
Science and ethics have universal intent but are also contextual. 
Holmes Rolston III    349 
EDUCATING COMPETENT CRITICS 
In education a dynamic equilibrium is often established between re- 
spect for knowledge already (presumed to be) attained—the commu-
nity tradition—and radical criticism of that tradition, as needed for 
advancing knowledge. The clash of these two stories in moral and 
science education disrupts this rather delicate balance. 
Whoever seeks an education (the high school youth included) needs 
to assume by common sense that fathers and mothers have already 
learned something worth passing to sons and daughters. Science 
agrees: by natural selection, only traditions that work survive. That 
these systems are established, functional, tested, is presumptive evi-
dence in their favor. Loren Graham, historian of science at MIT, 
writes: "Human beings are probably wiser than they know; both the 
genetic bases of their behavior and the cultural, ethical bases of their 
behavior have been selectively tested throughout the evolution of civili-
zation" (Graham 1979, 39). If so, we can preferentially trust our innate 
capacities when these are educated by the classical ethical and religious 
systems. 
No one thinks much who thinks alone; we think intersubjectively in 
dialogue with myriads of others. However, in science, ethics, or reli-
gion, when everyone thinks alike no one thinks very much. "Iron 
sharpens iron, and one man sharpens another" (Proverbs 27:17). 
Truth comes from the "collision of adverse opinions" (Mill [1859] 1961, 
245; Eger 1988, 296), from "the enterprise of giving honest reasons 
and welcoming radical questions" (Scheffler 1965,11; Eger 1988,294). 
Semper reformanda was a Reformation watchword; the growth of science 
has deepened that conviction. Traditions must launch and guide but 
underdetermine an education, leaving enough openness for mutation 
and growth, trial and error exploration. This benefits both the individ-
ual and the tradition. If one actually has the truth, one need not fear 
that it will be damaged by criticism. If one thinks one has the truth (but 
might not) one should welcome criticism; only thereby is error de-
tected. Hence the cognitive benefits of pluralism. 
The paradox of a paradigm, whether in science, ethics, or religion, is 
that the longer it survives, the better its interpretive and functional 
power, the closer we probably are to the truth, and the more we ought 
to hang on to it because it is to be expected that the nearer we are to the 
truth, the harder a theory will be to overthrow. The ultimate theory, if 
ever one is found, will be unfalsifiable anywhere in practice. It will be 
logically flawless because it is entirely true. Just this element of trust 
that is well justified makes it harder to get a wedge of doubt in, to seek 
truth in unlikely directions, to challenge the prevailing authorities. 
One needs both to seek disconfirmations and to distrust them. 
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All this demands an already competent critic, but how do we educate 
critics? Is this best accomplished by presenting eighth graders with a 
smorgasbord of conflicting views and leaving them to make up their 
own minds? Critical insight comes with serious participation in a form 
of life as surely as with naive detachment. Perhaps coming under the 
sway (the test) of a "controlled presentation"—whether of a scientific or 
a moral system—sharpens powers of perception and judgment. 
Whether relativity theory or monotheistic ethics, one has to learn a 
tradition sympathetically, empathetically, before one has the power to 
criticize it—especially if the criteria are intrasystemic. A premature 
invitation to skepticism is an invitation to misunderstanding. If there 
are truths that come only with conditioned disclosure, a novice is in no 
position to judge. 
Teachers should not present students with diverse alternatives, good 
and bad, and then "sit idly by while students 'decide' an issue that they 
are in no position to resolve rationally. ... Teachers have the right, as 
well as the responsibility, to give their students as clear a picture of the 
way the world works as we now possess" (Kitcher 1982,176). However, 
is that the case in science education, and something else in moral 
education? 
DIRECTED EDUCATION? 
The clash of the two stories forces us to ask how far science education 
and moral education are analogous in this balance between respect for 
and criticism of tradition. This question has to be asked first in terms of 
what fosters progress, historically, on the frontiers of the respective 
disciplines. Facts and causes are the domain of science, values and 
duties the domain of ethics; but criticism is equally requisite in both 
domains. Those who are familiar with philosophical education know 
that critical dissent is cultivated. A theological seminary can and ought 
to be as critical an environment as a graduate school in physics. The 
rabbis put it aphoristically: "Where there are two Jews, there are three 
opinions!" 
The question has to be asked, secondly, at the level of biography as 
persons enter a discipline. Lawrence Kohlberg claims that there are six 
(or seven) stages in the moral life; no analogous claims have been made 
for scientific life. He further claims that conflict-induced reorientation 
is needed to advance to each higher moral stage. If true in the logic and 
psychology of morals, this might not be true in science. Perhaps we gain 
moral convictions differently from the way we gain scientific convic-
tions. 
How much should be prechosen? More in science than morals? Or vice 
versa? There does seem a relevant difference. The student is not free to 
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choose in logic, algebra, physics, biology. To ignore what others have 
learned is to choose ignorance over education. Students have to be 
"trained," to follow in the tracks of what ancestors have discovered, 
before they can make any further discoveries of their own. An eighth 
grader (or adult) is no more free to choose natural history than to 
choose the nutritional value of potatoes. 
A moral value held by the pressure of consensus, not yet chosen, is 
juvenile, not adult. On that point values clarification insists, against the 
behaviorism otherwise often rampant in public schools. Whatever is 
recommended by the mentors ("Thou shalt not steal, murder, commit 
adultery, bear false witness") remains external until internalized by the 
oncoming generation. Moral responsibility demands a level of agency 
that science education does not. People are responsible for their values 
as they are not for their science. Content in relation to process differs; 
directed science education is desirable; directed moral education is not. 
There must be more context of choice. That is half the truth. Is it the 
whole truth? 
Is there no moral tradition to which the young student should be 
directed? There is no agreement on the frontiers in morals (abortion, 
homosexuality) or science (whether selection operates primarily at the 
level of genes, organisms, species; whether we can naturalize epis- 
temology). Yet there is widespread agreement in morals as there is in 
science. Over the centuries, based on long experience, moral conclu-
sions are really more stable than scientific conclusions. Honor parents; 
do not steal, murder, commit adultery, lie—the second table of the Ten 
Commandments, to which all Christians and Jews attach the first table. 
The Golden Rule is endorsed around the world. The United States by 
legislation prohibits slavery, racial discrimination, polygamy. Few per-
sons will quarrel with many of the twelve points in the Scout law. Out of 
the past, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, 
Jr., will do as exemplars who respected the tradition and splendidly 
criticized it. 
EVALUATING NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE 
When the two tales clash, there arise questions of implicit understand-
ings of human nature. Both science and moral education orient the 
student in the world in ways too subtle and profound for the eighth 
grader or even the teacher to detect. Even the "experts" in evolutionary 
theory, ethics, and psychology have the biological bases of human 
behavior under intense debate. Despite claims of neutrality, the values 
clarification program does make certain assumptions about human 
nature—that humans are and ought to be self-actualizing, free, and 
able to make their own rational decisions from early youth onward. 
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Notwithstanding claims to be scientific and value-free, evolutionary 
teaching does carry overtones for human self-estimates—that humans 
have evolved under the forces of natural selection, with mind, be-
havior, and drives shaped accordingly. To make matters worse, these 
implicit anthropologies may be incoherent. 
The theory of evolution is about the remote origins of Earth's living 
forms, but it has complex implications for present human 
self-understanding. Are humans specially created in the image of 
God or descended randomly from the apes? The popular version 
exaggerates the dichotomy, but it cannot be denied that evolutionary 
science radically affects human self-estimates. The evolutionary 
scientists themselves have been the first to draw those conclusions. 
Gavin de Beer, in the learned and authoritative Encyclopedia Britan- 
nica, after telling us that "evolution is accepted by all biologists," con-
cludes, "Darwin did two things: he showed that evolution was a fact 
contradicting scriptural legends of creation and that its cause, natural 
selection, was automatic with no room for divine guidance or design. 
Furthermore, if there had been design it must have been very malefi-
cent to cause all the suffering and pain that befell animals and men" 
(de Beer 1973, 23). This encyclopedia is in almost every high school 
library in the nation, routinely extolled as a paradigm authority. 
G. G. Simpson, a justly admired Yale paleontologist, concludes a 
popular evolutionary survey, in print in three editions over a genera-
tion, and likewise found in high school libraries nationwide: "Man was 
certainly not the goal of evolution, which evidently had no goal. He was 
not planned, in an operation wholly planless. He is not the ultimate in a 
single constant trend toward higher things" (Simpson 1949, 292). Such 
scientists ought, of course, to express their convictions; other scientists 
conclude differently. Meanwhile let no one say that evolutionary 
theory is value-free, in principle or in practice. 
If this is a sample of the result when we "offer children the best-sifted 
and most firmly grounded ideas that we have" (Ruse 1982, 328), then 
one may want to offer eighth graders a little assistance in how to 
question authority. "What Creationists really propose," laments Philip 
Kitcher, "is a situation in which people without scientific training— 
fourteen-year-old students, for example—are asked to decide a com-
plex issue on partial evidence" (Kitcher 1982,176; Eger 1988,298). The 
bright young readers of Encyclopedia Britannica or of Simpson's The 
Meaning of Evolution in the high school library are hardly asked by these 
authoritative scientists to do anything less, unless it is merely to accept 
these experts' authoritative conclusions about human origins and na-
ture. 
After the bell rings, moving out of biology class into social studies, or 
health, or wherever values clarification is taught, little may be said 
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about origins, but as much and more will be implicit or explicit about 
human nature. Eighth graders will be taught, enthusiastically, that they 
can and ought to face decisions about right and wrong with a radically 
open mind—trusting their own "free rational judgment" (Scheffler 
1965, 11; Eger 1988, 294) to decide what is best for themselves. High 
schoolers will, on average, do the right thing if given clarified options; 
and even for those who do the bad thing, freedom to choose the bad is 
better than moral pressure that biases to the right. 
That eighth graders, coached by a little nondirective values clarifica-
tion, can make good decisions with radically open minds, in full control 
of biasing desires, free from peer pressures, advertising influences, 
unconscious drives, useful and independent critics of their 
tradition—that may be the arrogance of humanism as much as the 
truth. Will the student be advised that Jesus, Buddha, Aristotle, Augus-
tine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Blaise Pascal, 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Sigmund Freud, and B. F. Skinner believed 
otherwise—that (as we next see) the contemporary Darwinians believe 
something quite different? 
BIOLOGICAL NATURE AND ETHICAL EDUCATION 
Just what is the connection of human rationality with moral decisions? 
How far are humans biased by self-interest or genetic forces? Or sin? 
Are the convictions we can hold embedded in nature, as well as culture? 
While the biology classes and values clarification programs are under-
way in the high schools, some experts "upstairs" in discussions at the 
university claim that altruism is and must be—so far as we have evolved 
by natural selection—disguised self-interest. Michael Ghiselin, an evo-
lutionary theorist, insists of each person that, "Given a full chance to act 
in his own interest, nothing but expediency will restrain him from 
brutalizing, from maiming, from murdering—his brother, his mate, 
his parent, or his child. Scratch an 'altruist,' and watch a 'hypocrite' 
bleed" (Ghiselin 1974, 247). 
Richard Dawkins concludes, "We are survival machines—robot vehi-
cles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as 
genes." "Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are 
born selfish" (Dawkins 1976, ix, 3). If so, perhaps eighth graders (and 
adults) need more than an invitation to make their own free, rational 
decisions with a radically open mind. 
Philosophers and biologists once were inclined to say that ethics was 
independent of biology. Some say that still. Richard D. Alexander, 
another evolutionary theorist, exclaims, "What does evolution have to 
say about normative ethics, or defining what people ought to be doing?" 
"Nothing whatsoever" (Alexander 1979, 276). However, E. O. Wilson, 
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Pulitzer prize-winning Harvard theorist, demurs. "What... made the 
hypothalamus and limbic system? They evolved by natural selection. 
That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and 
ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists, at all 
depths." "Scientists and humanists should consider together the possi-
bility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from 
the hands of philosophers and biologicized" (Wilson 1975, 3, 562). 
Michael Ruse, an expert witness in the Arkansas trial, concludes that 
"the good is simply that which evolution through selection has led us to 
regard as good" (Ruse 1984,93). That truth, if it is a truth, will certainly 
be relevant in the values clarification class. Unlike Dawkins and Ghise- 
lin, Ruse thinks that genuine altruism evolves consistently with natural 
selection. Meanwhile, we do want to know what power and options 
eighth graders (or adults) have in deciding good and evil, in clarifying 
their own values, or at least we might be cautioned about what we do 
not yet know. 
Ruse, Dawkins, Ghiselin, Wilson and the others would no doubt 
consider all this too unsifted as yet to teach dogmatically in the eighth 
grade. Even if these debates do not trickle down into high school 
classrooms, they reveal profound issues hovering in the background of 
science education and moral education. Far from assuming that, left to 
their own free choices, students will on average choose what is best, a 
real possibility is that biologists and theologians (joined by Freudian 
psychologists) have more in common against liberal humanists than 
first appears. Paul, in his New Testament letters, found a perennial 
brokenness in human life that must be redeemed before humans are 
capable of doing the good. 
Donald T. Campbell, who considers himself a hard-nosed Darwin-
ian, holds that, left to their biological nature and enlightened self- 
interest, humans would not move beyond a thirty percent mutually 
beneficial cooperation. Cultures in the form that we know them would 
be impossible. The ethical preachings of the classical cultures move this 
thirty percent cooperation over to a biosocial optimum at sixty percent 
cooperation, curbing our biological drives enough to make civilization 
possible. Traditional religious moralizing inhibits innate selfishness; it 
lifts us from nature and sustains culture. Indoctrination by the tradi-
tion makes us nobler humans (Campbell 1976, 193). 
An invitation for eighth graders to question parental authority with a 
radically open mind, to choose what they think best for themselves, 
might bring social reform and a better society. However, if culture has 
evolved over millennia to constrain and enlighten nature, this might be 
an invitation to become less human and act like beasts. 
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